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CONGRESSIONAL HUNGER CENTER 
Strengthening United Nations Human Rights Efforts in Rwanda/Burundi 
Progress Report, Number Three 
February 24, 1995 
P.02109 
The Congressional Hunger Center (CHC), in support of the human rights concerns of its 
Chainuan, Congressman Tony P. Hall, conducted another mission to Rwanda, Burundi 
and Geneva during the period February 5-14, 1995. This is part of the CHC's continuing 
effort, supported by the Reebok Foundation and several nongovernmental organizations, 
to facilitate the unprecedented deployment of United Nations human rights monitors to 
Rwanda. CHC staff confinned the following findings and recommendations: 
I. The Human Rights Field Office, Rwanda (HRFON.) Becomes Fully Operational 
A. Einding 
In sharp contrast to their findings in November, 1994, CHC staff on this visit found a 
functioning .field office ofHRFOR in Kigali, and an increasingly effective team of 
approximately 100 of the totall47 UN human rights monitors approved for deployment in 
Rwanda. Monitors at most field sites are performing .all the organic human rights 
functions required in Rwanda, ie., monitoring current abuses in both public and private 
sectors; Ql:Ulducting genocide investigations; and proyiding teclmical cooperation and 
.a-<!ric.e.in admini.>"tration of justice. Already HRFORis commencing a vital, perhaps the 
most definitive, and certainly the most cost-eJ.fective, impact on recovery and ll.ll1ilm:. 
building in Rwanda. Staffing, structure and leadership in the Kigali office have 
strengthened remarkably over the past two months. To be sure, European/African regional 
tensions have emerged in the Kigali office. Geneva is aware of these tensions and is taking 
pains to claritY job descriptions of senior officials to reduce misunderstandings. 
]:3. B,~comm~ndatioa 
Progress made by the Office Director Bill Clarance needs to be acknowledged and fully 
supported by the NGO and governmental communities. Clarance should be provided the 
security of a longer-term appointment, at least to the end of the 1995 calendar year. The 
Geneva headquarters must underline with Clarance's deputy the agreed division oflabor, 
i.e., that tlJ.e deputy will concentrate primarily on ad.mirti~trative, logistics and operational 
support matters (while being the alter ego in Clarance's absence)-- thus freeing Clarance 
to do 'I'Al.at he does best, i.e., field operations. It is still very early in the operation to be 
able to place the HR.FOR completely Oil auto-pilot. In the absence of adequate supporting 
am1sory an.d facilitating services from other UN agencies (whose mandate it is to assure 
that all the pieces are in place for a successful hUJllJl.Ilitarian operation), the Congressional 
Hunger Center will need to continue filling this gap over the next several weeks. 
I 
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n. The Human Rights Progra~ in Rwanda Starts to get Respect 
A Finding . . . . . 
Human rights field monitors get respect and perfon:nance from local civilian and military 
officials to the extent that the monitors establish productive relationships and add value to 
the Rwandan nation-building task. The more mature human rights staff are succeeiling in 
establishing such relationships and in developing constructive partnerships with the Army, 
(RPA), gendarmerie, magistrates and local governro.ent officials. Recognition and respect 
from fellow UN agencies is always the hardest for a new "guy on the UN block" to come 
by. Yet the negative comments seem to be down sharply from the CHC November visit 
and hints of positive UN acceptance in the UN family are appearing in some quarters. 
This improved HRFOR professionalism and performance are due in no small measure to 
CHC's persistent advocacy and facilitation of 1) Participatory preparedness training; 
2)Tougher, more realistic recruiting criteria; 3) Matching people deployments more 
closely with the vehicular and logistics deployments essential for mobility in the field; and 
4) Suppqrt to an operationally orient.;d office structure for HRFOR, Rwanda. CHC 
pressed for, and saw the HCHR achieve, the same standards for selection, training and 
deployment of the European Union (EU) monitors as for the monitors from other sources 
(the EU monitors are just now in the process of becoming an organic part of the UN 
Rwandan operation). 
B. Recomxr:mdatiQu 
CHC must continue to work to maintain the rigorous standards for personal recruitment, 
and to weed out those who prove to be unfit; to improve the standards for the 
participatory training workshops (especially, get rid of the dry lectures); to assure full 
integration of the EU monitors under Bill Clarance's leadership; to insist on frequent flow 
of substantive operational information to interested UN member states (especially to 
donor states); and to help facilitate public jnfonnation on this extraordinary example of 
impacting people protection and n atjQu-building in a fuiled state. 
m. HRFOR Tailors its Operation to Needs on the Ground 
A. Finding 
In Southeast Rwanda (the Kibungo area where a high Tutsi concentration existed 
pre-April 6, 1994) revenge killings, arbitrary arrests and torture by renegade soldiers and 
abusive local officials, have driven HRFOR into an intensive surveillance operation. Bill 
Clarance invented it and dubbed it "tactical monitoring.'' This creative effort is getting top 
. government attention and support in Kigali. It seems to offer the best way to modify 
and! or stop the pattern oflocal abuses in perhaps the roost dangerous quarter of Rwanda. 
HRFOR is going to the source of the on-going abuses that were first documented in the 
/?-. 
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Gersony assessment coi.U.Olissioned by the High CollJ.ll1issioner for Refugees (ill-;'HCR) in 
late summer 1994. 
While HRFOR pe.tfornJS the other functions of its holistic mandate, including 
genocide investigation and technical cooperation in the Southeast as well, it is able to 
concentrate on these more acceptable sectors (to the Rwandan government) in such 
regions as Cyangugu alongside Lake :Kivu in the Soutbw.est. Here local civilian and 
military officials, together with the populace, receive human rights education in the 
schools; technical advisory services in administration of justice (helping on the caseload of 
over 20,000 prisoners in deplorable states of detention), and investigation of the horriii.c 
acts of genocide that occurred post-April6, in the Cyangugu area. Such welcome and 
positive contn'butions make the less palatable pill of ~rrent abJ.!ss;. monitoring easier to 
swallow. 
The UN human rights team in Cyangugu has had extraordinary success in 
cultivating professional and constructive relationships with local civilian and military 
officials. The more hopeful climate for hUtnan rights also owes a great deal to the 
Cyangugu Prefect; he is a graduate in human rights from the University ofLyon and is a 
llll!jor reason for the acceptance and success of the UN's holistic human rights efforts in 
that region. 
:!LliecommeudatiOA 
The creative "tactical monitoring" initiative must be acknowledged (as a Ullljor 
innovation by the HRFOR Director Bill Clarance) and supported by both the host 
gove:mment and international community. The holistic package ofhurnan rights services, 
which can be administered in most of the rest of Rwanda, must be viewed as both organic 
and essential to the continued effectiveness of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
This holistic approach must be recognized as a sine qua non for all future human rights 
field operations, e.g:, in Burundi. The UN Development Program (UNDP) needs to 
support this function as an integral part of the HCHR's mandate and play an active 
fundraising role through Round Table donor conferences to enable the HCHR to 
discharge this mainstream component ofhis responsibilities. 
IV. Human Rights Headquarters in Geneva Must Catch up with its Operational 
Culture in the Field 
A Finding 
There is now a mtntali~, and a developing culture for humap, rights operatioo.5 in 
the field. Ir is in Rwanda today; it must be in Burundi tomorrow; and it will be required in 
conjunction with all too =Yother current, and future, complex hUJllanitarian 
emergencies. But for the Rwanda operation to IIlllintain .momentum and succeed, for a 
Bunmdi operation to make an impact, indeed, for the future viability of the very Office of 
the High Commissioner itseli; the HCHR must personally devote himself to the rapid 
development of both an Qlt~ and capacity within his immediate office in 
Geneva. (The immediate office of the new UN High Commissioner for Human rights is 
very small, understandably lacks an operational capability at this point, and must rely on. 
the larger, legal paperwork-oriented Human Rights Center in Geneva for operational 
P.04109 
CONGRSSNL HUNGER CNTR Fax:202-547-7575 Feb 28 '95 15:33 P.OS/09 
backup required for Rwanda. :Mr. Mautner-Markhof of the Center is doing a hercule~job 
in providing this support. His considerable skills could b_e leveraged greatly, ho";ever, ifhe 
were part of an augmented operational task force orgaru~ to_ the Office of the I?~ 
Commissioner.) failure or delay in developing this capacity m the Hl...!ili ComnnsSJon~r's 
office effectively jeopardizes the Rwanda and Bu,;undi operations. It may also place m. 
question the very future ofl!lllintai:ni:ng a Human Rights High Commissioner in the Uruted 
Nations. 
B. Recomm~ndation 
While High Commissioner Ayala-Lasso indicated in a meeting with CHC 
Executive Director Gene Dewey on February 13, that he might need to sweep an 
operational capability into his own office for ~-da. he still hoped to be able to mount 
future field operations out of the Human Rights Center in Geneva (in part because of turf 
concerns within the Center itself). Dewey told hlm, in effect, that there just was not time 
for the Center to shift gears from a radically different sectE:tariat role to an operational 
~role. US officials in Washington and Geneva must continually reinforce the 
imperative for an organic, holistic, human rights QPerational capability in Ayala-Lasso's 
immediate office. And the international humanitarian system-- NGOs, l.JN agencies, and 
serious UN member states need to a.c~ and sup:p.Q.U the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights as the fuu.a.b. (in addition to l.JNHCR, UNICEF and 
WFP), and fhlly. operational a gene>: in the UN humanitarian constellation. 
V. The Rwandan Government Needs Credit for Ruman Rights Progress, per se, and 
to Reinforce 1\-Iore Positive Performance Where its Record is Still Weak 
A. Finding 
There is commendable discipline and significant human rights progress on the part 
of senior Rwandan government officials in Kigali -- especially V1ce President and Defense 
Minister Kagame. But Kagame, along with some other senior officials, tends to regard the 
current abuse monitoring role ofHRFOR as a vote of no-confidence in the ability of the 
government to protect its ov..n citizens. There is insufficient feedback, crediting him v..ith 
doing good things, to counteract his negative perception of the UN human rights efforts 
RecommendatiQu 
Visitors to Kagame, and to other senior Rwandan offi~ials probably need to 
overcorrect a bit by acknowledging the RPFs statesmanship in accepting UN human rights 
monitors and in taking on the less palatable aspects (i.e. the HRFOR "policing" fimction 
with respect to current abuses) along \\lith those the RPF \Velcomes (accountability for 
genocide and technical cooperation). CHC staff recommended to HCHR, and he 
accepted, the idea of making field visits on his next Rwanda trip (probably around March 
10) in the company of Vice President Kagame. They would visit the weak spots in the 
Southeast where the vice president and HCHR could see together the problem of abusive 
local officials and the need for tactical monitoring. HCHR would be able to commend, 
and reinforce, Kagame's action in dealing v..1th these officials (h.e claims to have fired some 
of them). In the Southwest (Cyangugu area) they would see together the difference that 
1. 
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cooperative officials make, and the major contn'butions HRFOR is making, .to confidenc~ 
and nation-building in Rwanda. Such steps could contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy m 
tenns of continued improvements in official Rwandan behavior. 
VI. Internal Strengthening of Some lJ'"N Agencies (Especially DHA), and Mu~al 
Reinforcement From Others (UNDP) are Essential to Effective UN lluman Rights 
Field Operations. 
A ;fnternal Strengthening --the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) 
1. Findings 
DHA's intended function is not to Ulll, or even coordinate, complex hu.man.itarian 
operations. UN member states (with strong support in the US Congress from 
Representative Tony Hall) created DHA in 1992 to [aQilita~ international humanitarian 
operations -- whether emergency relief; or human rights -- and make sure lhey go well. 
As such, DHA is the agency accountable -- to the Secretary General, to UN members and 
emergency victims-- for how well, and how poorly, an operation goes. Yet, UN member 
states have not supported, or insisted sufficiently on the imperative for DHA to organize 
and staff itself to assure that such vital field operations as the Rwanda human rights 
monitor deployment go well. Largely because of this lack offollow-through by member 
states which created DHA, the Congressional Hunger Center faced up to the need to help 
fill this gap for the Rwandan human rights operation. Because the office of the HCHR was 
so new and inexperienced, "value-added" from outside was needed to help assure 
yehjculax: and logistical deployments matched pi:o.ple deployments to Rwanda; HCHR 
needed_assistance in quality personnel selection and in ®ality readin!:SS training of .field 
monitors; and above all, it needed dedicat!:d fundraising efforts. to sequre adequate 
.financial support through the UN's consolidated appeal process. The Congressional 
Hunger Center is helping with this stop-gap role, pending development of such a capacity 
withln the UN itsel£ 
2. Recommendation 
The Congressional Hunger Center is prepared to continue its operational support 
role to UN humanitarian operations, provided sufficient private funding becomes available. 
The longer tern~. solution, however, is to flesh out this capacity within the UN Department 
of Humanitarian Affairs. Since DHA is already a major agenda item for the summer 
session of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in Geneva, the Rwanda 
human rights deployment offers a classic example of the kind of humanitarian operation 
DHA was created to facilitate. The US Delegation to ECOSOC should build on this 
example, recall the DHA strengthening plan (the Dewey "Get-Well" proposal) the US 
Govem:ment pushed in the 1993 ECOSOC session, and develop support in the 1995 
ECOSOC meeting to achieve refonns and strengthening which would enable DHA to 
perform fully its intended facilitating role in future h= rights deployments (e.g., a 
preventive deployment to Burundi) and other major .field operations. 
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l3. Mum~l Reinforcement •• The UN Developme.J.ttErogram (UNDP) 
1. Findings . . . . . 
Technical cooperation for administrative of;usttce ts a central, orgamc feature of 
the UNHCHR's holistic human rights operation in Rwanda. The UN Devel~~ment 
Program (UNDP), in its responsibilities to oversee the Round Tab.le fun~a.lsmg proc:ss 
for Rwanda, has a unique opportunity to reinforce the HCHR's pnmacy m llllplementmg 
technical cooperation in human rights for Rwanda. UNDP also needs to lobby for the 
HCHR -- both in the Round Table meetings and in the DHA Consolidated Appeals --to 
work with key donor states to assure full funding for the modest human rights cost 
components in HCHR's Rwanda progrants. 
2. Recommendation 
The US should develop a conse:u.sus among key UNDP governing council 
members to assure full UNDP ;;;uppou, especially financial support, to the UNHCHR in 
implementing this core program in Rwanda. Similarly, the US needs to press for support 
from both DHA and UNDP for adequate funding for an immediate preventive human 
rights monitor.dcployment to Bunmdj 
For the High Commissioner's upcoming visit to Rwanda, it is important that he 
receive an invitation from the Rwandan govemment, stressing the importance of the 
HCHR using the visit to articulate and accelerate his already developed plan of action as 
the IJN executivp agent for t~chnical coo.peratjon in tbe administration ofjustice. 
V1I. The High Commissioners for Refugees and Human Rights Need to Share 
Information 
A Finding 
P.07109 
Infortnation on root causes fbr refugees fleeing Rwanda, and. refusing to return to 
Rwanda, is vitally important to human rights teams in implementing techo.ical assistance 
programs and building confiden.ce inside Rwanda. UNHCR field staff in Zaire have 
already contacted UNHCHR staff across Lake Kivu in Cyangugu, suggesting that they 
determine root cause through direct interviews in the Zaire (Bukavu) camps. Geneva 
hl1.lllall rights headquarters currently holds that its staff can only work in Rwanda, 
UNHCR, meanwhile has not received, and/or not responded to any request to share this 
"root cause" information obtained by its protection officers in Zaire, Burundi and Tan.zan.ia 
camps. 
B. Recommendation 
CHC staff raised the problem with Mr. Mautner-Madmofat the Human Rights 
Center on February 13. Mautner-Markhofagreed to look into the possibilities ofjoint 
UNHCRIUNHCHR teams interviewing in the first asylum camps, so as to get around the 
problem of operating unilaterally outside Rwanda. 
Similarly, a request needs to go to the High Commissioner for Refugees to have 
her regional coordinator, Carroll Faubert, share agreed essential elements of information 
on a regular, frequeut basis \Vith Bill Clarence in Kigali. 
vm. An Historic Window is Open, Albeit Briefly, for a Preventive Deployment of 
Hum11n Rights Monitors in Burundi 
A Fin.dings 
Burundi is already far down the slippery slope to a Rwandaclike apocalypse. The 
country is an armed camp-- with machetes and Kalashnikofs at the ready (an~ to~ many 
of them already in use, even as you read this) at every level ofHutu and Tutst ~oe1ety. 
Both the American ambassador and the Secretary General's special representatiVe, have 
threats on their lives for trying to get at the truth of atrocities already occurring. Killings 
and severe human rights abuses are a daily, and nightly, way oflife. Yet Burundi's 
President believes there is still time to help "With history's .first-ever preventive deployment 
ofhumru1 rights monitors. The committed, but fragile UN Human Rights Office in 
Bujumbura joins the Burundi President in this desperate appeal for monitors to provide a 
presence throughout the Burundi countryside. The President's office appealed to CHC's 
executive director Dewey on February 11 for help in formulating and implementing such 
an unprecedented request. Dewey agreed to help, and suggested that the President's 
Special Assistant also insure that the President's speech to the UNHCRIOAU-sponsored 
Refugee Conference in Bujumbura on Februa1y 15 include a call for this human. rights 
presence. This was done. Dewey further relayed this request and challenge to the Burundi, 
and US, permanent representatives to the UN in Geneva, to the UN High Commissioner 
for HUilllUl Rights, and to key contacts on the National Security Council staff and the 
Human Rights Bureau of the State Department. 
B. Recommendations 
Again, here is a gap and an apparent need for someone outside the formal UN 
structure to perform the DHA-type legwork of making this human rights presence in 
Burundi a reality. 'This historic preventive deployment should be facilitated through the 
following three-track approach: · 
1. Arrange for the form.al. request to be drafted from the President of Bumndi, to 
be relayed through the High. Commissioner for H= Rights (with a copy to the 
Secretary-General's Special Representative in Bunm.di) to the UN Secretary-General. 
(CHC sta:ffrequested the Human Rights Officer in Bujumbura to work with the assistant 
to the president, Kavakourie, who is the former ambassador to Washington, to draft and 
dispatch this fotmal request). 
2. Press for early introduction and passage in the current session of the UN Huma:n. 
Rights Commissioner in Geneva a resolution calling for iromediate funding for, and 
deployment o( a preventive human rights monitoring effort throughout the entire country 
of Burundi (CHC staff received encouragement for this idea from Political Counsellor 
Peter Eichert at the US Mission, Geneva. CHC's executive director requested the Burundi 
permanent representative in Geneva to work -..vith Eichert and other .friends of Burundi to 
bring this about. Key contacts in Washington were urged to include instructions 
supporting this plan to the US Dele9:ation to the current session of the UN Human rililits 
Commission in Geneva.). - ~ 
7. 
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3. Organize, with State Department's Human Rights Bureau and like-minded 
legislators a joint executive/legislative lobbying effort with UN member states of the 
Human Rights Commission -- both to pass the preventive deployment resolution, and to 
commit funding, on a high priority basis, for early implementation on the ground. Parallel 
efforts must be made with the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the UN 
Peacekeeping Department to factor into the human rights deployment package a workable 
security component for the monitors, since threats to such a presence are far greater in 
Burundi than in Rwanda. These efforts could well be the most important, and cost-
effective, investments that the US government, the UN Human Rights Commission, and 
indeed the international community as a whole, could make in the next four weeks. 
